Salvation, grace and sovereignty
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| Matthias Flacius taught a strong view of what later theologians would call total depravity. (Photo credit: Wikipedia) |
Paul raises in Romans 9:19, we cannot explain God’s sovereignty and man’s inability by appealing to conditional election or libertarian free will. This objection only makes sense if the Calvinistic doctrines of total depravity, unconditional election, and irresistible grace are true.
But how is that fair? How can God command that which is impossible, and still hold people accountable? How can He command people to be born again, even though the new birth depends entirely upon “God, who has mercy” (Rom 9:16)? Well, Paul’s answer is to rebuke the questioner who seeks to impugn the righteousness of God: “On the contrary, who are you, O man, who answers back to God?” (Rom 9:20). If you seek to find fault with God’s character, you have a skewed understanding of righteousness (Rom 9:14; cf. 3:5b–6) and better put your hand over your mouth fast.
But there is a way to ask the question out of a sincere desire to understand God and worship Him for how He has revealed Himself. And if the question is asked in that spirit, I believe there is a clear answer. And that is: God grants to His people what He requires of them.
This is the genius of grace. By commanding something of everyone that is impossible for them to do, God magnifies mankind’s true helplessness and inability related to our spiritual condition. And because He commands only what is possible for God Himself to accomplish, He magnifies His own sufficiency and fullness of glory. As Paul goes onto explain, He does this “to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy” (Rom 9:23).
By granting what He requires, God displays Himself as all in all. He places humanity in our proper position, as needy beggars eager to receive from His hand. Then, as our benefactor, He grants what He requires and thus captures our affections, so that we see Him as altogether lovely, altogether worthy, and altogether wonderful.
